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JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF
RELIGIOUS USE IN ZONING CASES
In 1971, the Christ Episcopal Church in Manhasset, New York and
the Long Island Jewish Medical Center jointly operated a "drug
center"1 in the Church's parish house. The drug center was designed
to provide counseling and guidance for non-addicted youths in the
earl), stages of experimentation with marijuana and other soft drugs.2
Finances, supervision and a paid staff3 were provided by the Medical
Center, while both the Church and the Medical Center undertook
certain security measures. The minister remained in daily contact
with the participating youths and the staff. Those accepted as par-
ticipants were from homes in the immediate neighborhood of the
Church, as well as in surrounding communities. Evidence of how
many of the participants were members of the Church's congregation
was not presented.
In Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,; neighbors of the
Church filed an injunction suit claiming that operation of a drug
center was not a religious use and, therefore, illegal under current
zoning provisions. Both parties conceded that the local zoning ordi-
nance authorized the construction of the Church and any buildings
on the church property that were used "exclusively for religious pur-
poses.",; The Church and Medical Center contended that operation
1. Defendants attempted to label the activity as a "day care center" since such
a center was construed as an acceptable religious use in Unitarian Universalist
Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Plaintiffs
claimed that the nomenclature did not accurately characterize the activity since
the only youths participating were those involved with the use of the milder forms
of drugs. The court agreed with plaintiffs' contention and used the term "drug
center" throughout the opinion. Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66
Misc. 2d 312, 313, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
2. The drug center was not equipped with residential facilities, an overnight
staff, medicines or drugs for the detoxification of addicted drug users. Therefore,
the addicted drug user or the user of hard drugs was excluded from the program.
Careful screening of all potential participants and certain security measures were
adopted to exclude the addicted drug user.
3. The staff consisted of medical, social, psychiatric, vocational and educational
counselors.
4. 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
5. The Church property was in a "Residence B" district as designated by a
Town of North Hempstead building ordinance. This classification authorized
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of a drug center was a use for religious purposes and legal under
current zoning laws. The Supreme Court of Nassau County, New
York, denying in part plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, held
the drug center to be a religious use for purposes of zoning.0
On its face, Slevin is an important continuation of the New York
line of cases which have broadly defined religious use for zoning
purposes as "conduct with a religious purpose." In New York, the
only criterion for defining religious use is the determination of
whether that use is an activity with a religious purpose. An activity
with a religious purpose is any conduct which is in accordance with
the doctrines, practices or regulations of a religious organization8
By utilizing a broad definition of religious use, the New York
courts appear to have one objective-to avoid limiting the activities of
a church or religious organization to merely conducting worship
services. In the landmark decision, Community Synagogue v. Bates
the court stated:
A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the
opportunity to worship God. Strictly religious uses and activities
are more than prayer and sacrifice and all churches recognize
that the area of their responsibility is broader than leading the
congregation in prayer.
It is true that the religious aim of strengthening the congregation
through fellowship may not be permitted to be perverted into a
churches and other buildings used only for religious purposes, specifying the per-
missibility of parochial schools and parish houses. Id. at 313, 319 N.Y.S.2d at
941.
6. Plaintiffs contended that if the drug center was a religious use, it was still
a threat to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the community because
of its proximity to a school and the public library. The allegation claimed the
health and morals of children were endangered. The court held that there were
not sufficient facts to rule on this issue; therefore, the case was remanded to the
trial court for a review of the facts in this area. Id. at 319-21, 119 N.Y.S.2d at
947-48.
7. 66 Misc. 2d at 316, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
8. In re Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 453, 136 N.B.2d 488,
493, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 21-22 (1956); In re Faith for Today, Inc., 11 App. Div.
2d 718, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1960). See also Shaffer v. Temple Beth Emeth, 198
App. Div. 607, 197 N.Y.S. 841 (1921) (where the court took judicial notice that
the modern church involved more activities than merely performing sacrifices and
leading worship); In re Garden City Jewish Center, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 157
N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
9. 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
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RELIGIOUS USE
justification for establishing a place of entertainment, such as a
country club.21 (Emphasis added.)
Recognizing that the activities of any religious organization may
transcend the traditional roles of prayer and worship, New York
courts have placed only one requirement on the religious use of
property: that such use be justified as incidental to the doctrines,
practices, creed or rules of a religious denomination or organization.
The significance of the Bates decision was its impact on subsequent
New York decisions. Utilizing the reference in Bates to the establish-
ment of a country dub as a perversion of the definition of religious
use," New York courts displayed a willingness to find most church-
associated activities which fell between the specified limits of leading
worship and establishing a country club to be religious uses.
The decisions subsequent to Bates were rendered in two phases.
The earlier decisions held that a variety of activities provided for the
use of the members of a particular congregation or religious sect
were religious uses under the zoning ordinances.- This interpreta-
tion was deemed to include secular functions, such as the operation
of radio, television and publishing facilities, because a particular
religious organization utilized these means to spread its doctrine. 13 In
the later decisions, culminating in the Slevin opinion, the courts con-
strued the definition of religious use to include activities which were
not contemplated for the sole use of a single congregation or parish.1
In two of the later cases the definition has even included activities not
under the exclusive control and supervision of a religious organiza-
tion." Thus, in the Slevin decision, the court found that a commu-
10. Id. at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
11. Id.
12. The activities in the following cases were held to be religious uses: Diocese
of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d
(1956) (parish house and convent); Temple Israel v. Plaut, 10 Misc. 2d 1084,
170 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (recreational facilities and gymnasium); In re
Garden City Jewish Center, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 157 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(social and community service groups).
13. In re Faith for Today, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 718, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751
(1960).
1-I. Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v. Downer, 59 Misc. 2d 387, 302
N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Diocese of Central New York v. Schwarzer, 23
Misc. 2d 515, 199 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
15. Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 982, 314
N.Y.S.2d 66, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v.
Downer, 59 Misc. 2d 387, 388, 302 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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nity drug center jointly operated by a church and a hospital was per-
missible under the zoning exception permitting the religious use of
property.
Decisions in several other states follow the reasoning of the New
York courts in broadly construing religious use to be "conduct with
a religious purpose."'16 However, a few jurisdictions, notably Texas
and New Jersey, have looked to other criteria in construing religious
use. The lower courts in both those states have formulated narrow
definitions of the term "church," thus limiting the definitions of
religious use and religious purpose. 17 In several decisions, these courts
have construed the term "church" in its general and traditionally
accepted meaning. 8 The New Jersey lower court held that the usual
meaning of church was a place where people gathered for worship
and conducted such services and administrative work as pertained to
that worship;19 and, specifically rejected the opinion expressed by the
Indiana Appellate Court 20 which held that the term "church" in-
cluded any building used either for worship or purposes connected
with the faith of a religious organization.2 ' Furthermore, the New
Jersey court stated that implicit in the classification of "accessory use" 22
16. Garbaty v. Norwalk Jewish Center, Inc., 148 Conn. 376, 171 A.2d 197
(1961); Synod of Chesapeake v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1969);
Corporation of Presiding Bishops v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185 (1968);
Marht v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 5, 142 N.E.2d 567(C.P. 1955).
17. Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1951) and
cases cited therein; Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970); Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
18. Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, 253, 85 A.2d 833, 836 (Super. Ct.
1951); Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
19. 17 N.J. Super. at 255, 85 A.2d at 837.
20. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597
(1948).
21. The Wheaton court citing Scott v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, Diocese of
Oregon, 83 Ore. 97, 108, 163 P. 88, 91 (1917) held that the local zoning ordi-
nance, providing for the construction of a church, included the construction of a
convent and school:
A building may be erected for church purposes other than those connected
with divine worship. The word "church" applies not only to a building used
for worship, but to any body of Christians holding and propagating a par-
ticular form of belief... ; and any building intended to be used primarily
for purposes connected with the faith of such religious organization may be
said to be used for church purposes . . . and in this sense the erection of a
convent is as much a church purpose as a house of general worship.
Id. at 46, 76 N.E.2d at 601.
22. The zoning ordinance in this case specifically provided for the construction
of a church or synagogue and any use "accessory" to these specific provisions.
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was the requirement that a building accessory to the functions of the
church be located on the same property.23 This definition indicates
that the religious use of any building will be construed as narrowly
as the term "church."
Slevin stands in opposition to such a narrow definition of church
or religious use as applied by the New Jersey court. The Slevin deci-
sion emphasizes that any activity associated with a church and its
religious purpose will be classified a religious use for zoning.24 A
comparison of the Texas opinion, Heard v. City of Dallas,25 with
Slevin reflects the conflicting holdings. The facts in Heard are similar
to those in Slevin. A day care facility for the preschool children of
working mothers was operated by the church minister and his wife
in the church rectory. Although religious training was a part of the
children's daily program, other subjects and recreational activities
were also included. The construction of a church, rectory or any
place of "worship and religious training" of a recognized religion was
permitted by the Dallas zoning ordinance.26 The Heard decision,
representative of the decisions in both Texas and New Jersey, held
that the usual and traditional meanings would be applied to the terms
"church" and "church uses;" thus placing the definitions within the
narrow confines of worship, church school or such closely related activ-
ities.2' Any intentions to include activities that are not directly
related to worship, sacrifice or religious training were not acceptable
for zoning purposes.28
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted a totally different
"Accessory use" is used interchangeably with religious use. 17 N.J. Super. at 249,
85 A.2d at 834.
23. Id. at 258, 85 A.2d at 839.
24. It should be noted that the religious use of any property is always subject to
the test of whether the activity endangers the public health, safety, morals or
welfare. In New York and several other states, churches and religious uses are
immune from many of the determining factors in this area. For a discussion of
this issue see Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 HAav. L. PEv. 1428 (1957). See also
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
25. 456 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
26. Id. at 442.
27. Id. at 444. See also Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
28. Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1951)
(presence of tiled bathrooms and beauty salon removed the ritualarium from the
strict religious use category); Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970) (normal activities of a school were not directly related to operation
of a church).
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standard.29 While the reasoning in Slevin looked only to the religious
purpose of the activity, the Pennsylvania Court examined the purpose
of the zoning ordinance and the nature of the proposed use. Asked
to consider the permissibility of a cemetery under the zoning pro-
visions,30 the majority ignored the issue of whether a cemetery was a
religious use.31 Appellants argued that a cemetery was a religious
use because burial was an important part of the creed and doctrine of
the Russian Orthodox Church, making the construction of a cemetery
a use with a religious purpose. Instead of considering this issue, the
majority noted the purpose of the zoning ordinance: "area homo-
geneity."3 2 In establishing a residential district, the majority stated,
the drafters of the zoning ordinance intended to include only those
uses which were homogeneous to the continued growth and enjoy-
ment of the area. A cemetery, basically a secular use of land, was
not conducive to the continued enjoyment of a residential neighbor-
hood. Merely because the cemetery would be owned by a religious
organization did not change the fact that a cemetery would detract
from the purpose of the zoning provisions, which was to establish a
residential district. Based on this reasoning the majority held a ceme-
tery was not a religious use.33
Sle-vin is distinguishable from the Pennsylvania decision in its
holding concerning the effect of the religious use of property on the
character of the neighborhood. When asked to consider this issue,
the court stated: "If there are limits upon the extent to which the
residential character of a neighborhood can be destroyed by a re-
ligious user ... they are not apparent in . . . [the decisions rendered
in New York]." 34 The court refused to hold that the religious use of
property, even when liberally construed to include a drug center,
29. Appeal of Russian Orthodox Church, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959).
30. Local zoning provisions specifically allowed any educational, religious or
philanthropic use of property, as well as a hospital in a residential district. Id. at
131, 152 A.2d at 492.
31. Id. at 131, 152 A.2d at 492 (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 128, 152 A.2d at 490.
33. Id. at 129, 152 A.2d at 491. But see Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 351 Pa. 77, 40 A.2d 423 (1945), where the court examined the
use of a house as a synagogue, rabbi's office and private home, in terms of the
traditional role of the church in the United States. In light of that tradition, the
court found the utilization of the home a religious use under the zoning ordinance.
34. 66 Misc. 2d at 316, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
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would be detrimental to the character of the neighborhood as con-
templated by the drafters of the zoning ordinances.
Other jurisdictions have established narrow doctrines by refusing
to include incidental functions in the definition of religious use. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that the parking of buses on church
property would have to be proven a function incidental and com-
monly associated with church operations. 35 No evidence was pre-
sented that buses were essential to the operation of a church or that
they were customarily used; therefore, the court did not find the park-
ing of buses a religious use under the zoning laws.36 The Slevin doc-
trine looks only to the purpose of the activity in light of the rules and
practices of the Church. Where transportation was necessary to carry
members to and from services, as was the case in Colorado, the New
York lower courts would appear inclined to hold the parking of buses
on church property a religious use.
The Slevin decision is an unquestioned reaffirmation of the New
York doctrine of broadly construing religious use for zoning purposes.
A year prior to Slevin, in Unitarian Universalist Church of Central
Nassau v. Shorten,37 this same court held a day care center, operated
jointly by a church and a state agency, to be a religious use.38 Deci-
sions prior to Slevin, utilizing the reasoning in Bates, have established
a broad but undefined construction of religious use. Most courts
have been willing to find an activity lying somewhere between wor-
ship and the establishment of a country club as a religious use, with-
out explicitly stating the reasoning. Slevin carefully reasons why a
drug center is within the religious purpose: "The challenges of drugs
to the human mind and spirit can be fairly met by the moving thrust
of religious institutions. Indeed the essential moral alienation of
drug abuse seems most directly a religious problem. . . ."39 Further-
more, "few things are more critical to the brotherhood of man and
the religious activity of the church than assisting, in every way pos-
sible, to bring community youngsters to maturity as healthy, respon-
sible, contributing members of the community." 40 Since the human
35. East Side Baptist Church v. Klein, - Colo. - , 487 P.2d 549
(1971).
36. Id. at - , 487 P.2d at 550.
37. 63 Misc. 2d 978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
38. Id. at 982-83, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 71-72.
39. 66 Misc. 2d at 317, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
40. Id. at 317, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
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spirit and morals are a major concern of any religious institution,
the Slevin court did not merely find that the counseling of drug
users falls within the parameters of religious use as defined in Bates,
but that it is a religious purpose directly related to all religious doc-
trines. Any activity so directly related to this religious purpose must
be classified a religious use.
Slevin is explicit in its dismissal of plaintiffs' contentions that the
drug center is not a religious use unless operated solely by a church
for the benefit of the members of the congregation. The court held
that such a contention was diametrically opposed to the "modern
current of pan-ecumenicalism" and the "interchange of use of
religious institutions in our society today."41
By relying on current attitudes concerning the ecumenical role of
the modern church, Slevin displays the court's intentions to lay as
few limits on the purposes and activities of the Church as possible.
New York courts will look only to religious purpose, rejecting all
other criteria to measure the parameters of the definition of religious
use for zoning purposes. Therefore, so long as the courts can justify
an activity as incidental to the doctrines, practices or rules of a
religious organization, that activity will be construed to be a religious
use.
William L. Berry
41. Id. at 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
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